Abstract

European strategic autonomy has shifted from rhetorical aspiration to central policy objective amid renewed geopolitical rivalry and uncertainty within the transatlantic alliance. Advocates argue that Europe must acquire the capacity to act independently in matters of security and defense. This paper contends that while the normative case for autonomy is coherent, full strategic independence from the United States remains structurally constrained by enduring capability asymmetries embedded in the transatlantic system. Drawing on structural realism, alliance theory, and liberal institutionalism, the paper argues that Europe’s pursuit of autonomy risks becoming a strategic illusion if it disregards persistent hierarchies in nuclear deterrence, ISR dominance, and strategic logistics. Europe can recalibrate dependence through selective insulation and institutional reinforcement. It cannot eliminate structural hierarchy without a fundamental redistribution of power.

I. Introduction: Autonomy as Imperative and Anxiety

European strategic autonomy has become one of the defining debates of contemporary transatlantic politics. The Trump presidency exposed the fragility of assuming permanent American commitment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforced both the necessity of deterrence and the depth of European reliance on U.S. capabilities.

Political rhetoric frames autonomy as maturity, sovereignty, and geopolitical credibility. Yet the structural conditions underlying Europe’s security posture have not fundamentally changed.

The central question is not whether autonomy is desirable.

It is whether autonomy is structurally attainable under current distributions of capability.

This paper argues that Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy reflects legitimate political concerns, but maximalist autonomy—strategic independence from the United States—remains constrained by persistent asymmetries in nuclear deterrence, intelligence dominance, and logistical projection.

Autonomy may be politically compelling.
It is structurally limited.

II. The Normative Case for Strategic Autonomy

The appeal of autonomy rests on three pillars:

Political Sovereignty

European leaders increasingly resist vulnerability to shifts in American domestic politics. Strategic independence is framed as protection against unpredictability.

Strategic Credibility

A geopolitical actor requires autonomous capacity for deterrence and force projection. Dependence undermines credibility.

Burden-Sharing and Responsibility

Persistent reliance on American capabilities complicates Europe’s claim to global strategic relevance.

Liberal institutionalism suggests that alliances can evolve through burden redistribution and coordination.¹ Institutions lower transaction costs and facilitate adaptation. Yet institutions coordinate power—they do not equalize it.

The normative case explains why autonomy is pursued.
It does not establish its feasibility.

III. Structural Realism and the Distribution of Capability

Structural realism posits that the international system is anarchic and that outcomes are shaped by the distribution of capabilities.² Alliances organize hierarchy but do not eliminate asymmetry.

If autonomy requires independent deterrence, intelligence superiority, and sustainable deployment, then Europe’s position must be evaluated across these domains.

Three structural asymmetries remain decisive.

IV. Nuclear Hierarchy and Extended Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence anchors high-intensity security.

Within NATO, extended deterrence remains overwhelmingly American.³ France possesses an independent nuclear arsenal, yet its scale and doctrinal posture differ significantly from U.S. capabilities. The United Kingdom’s nuclear system remains operationally intertwined with American infrastructure.

European autonomy would require either:

• Expansion of national arsenals

• Formal Europeanization of deterrence

• Centralized political authority over nuclear doctrine

Such transformation demands levels of political integration Europe has not demonstrated.

Deterrence asymmetry is not rhetorical. It is material.

V. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Modern strategic advantage derives from informational dominance.

The United States maintains superiority in:

• Satellite architecture

• Real-time ISR networks

• Integrated C4ISR systems

• Target acquisition platforms

European situational awareness during the Ukraine conflict depended heavily on American intelligence streams.

Without ISR parity, conventional and logistical capacity lack operational coherence.

This gap reflects structural investment patterns and technological scale—not institutional oversight.

VI. Strategic Logistics and Force Projection

Autonomy requires deployability.

The United States maintains unmatched:

• Strategic airlift

• Sealift infrastructure

• Aerial refueling networks

• Forward logistics hubs

European forces remain fragmented across national procurement systems and limited in sustained expeditionary capacity.

Barry Posen’s analysis of European military power underscores the fragmentation and limited power projection depth of European states.⁴

Logistics determines endurance.

Autonomy without projection capacity remains rhetorical.

VII. Alliance Theory and Managed Hierarchy

Alliance politics offers further clarity.

Stephen Walt’s alliance theory suggests that states align in response to threat and distribution of power.⁵ Glenn Snyder emphasizes the bargaining dynamics embedded within asymmetric alliances.⁶

The transatlantic system functions as managed hierarchy rather than equal partnership.

From the American perspective, asymmetry stabilizes alliance politics:

• Security guarantees in exchange for political alignment

• Leadership reinforcing global strategic position

Incremental European burden-sharing is acceptable. Structural parity may not be.

Autonomy is relational. It cannot be pursued unilaterally within an alliance structured around asymmetry.

VIII. NATO–EU Institutional Overlap

European autonomy unfolds within dense institutional layering.

NATO remains the primary framework for collective defense. The EU emphasizes procurement coordination, industrial integration, and crisis management.

Institutional overlap does not equal structural transformation.

Efforts to strengthen EU defense risk duplication, fragmentation, and alliance friction if not carefully aligned with NATO commitments.

Institutions can mediate hierarchy. They do not dissolve it.

IX. Counterargument: Can Accelerated Integration Shift Structure?

A serious counterargument contends that structural constraints reflect historical underinvestment rather than permanent barriers.

Europe’s aggregate GDP rivals that of the United States. Coordinated defense spending, industrial consolidation, and centralized procurement could gradually reduce asymmetry.

In theory, power distributions evolve.

Yet accelerated integration requires:

• Unified doctrine

• Political willingness to subordinate national defense industries

• Sustained fiscal prioritization

• Deepened political integration

Such transformation remains politically improbable.

Autonomy is theoretically possible.

It remains structurally constrained under present conditions.

X. Strategic Insulation as Realistic Objective

The alternative to illusion is calibration.

Europe’s rational path lies in selective insulation:

• Defense industrial consolidation

• ISR capacity expansion

• Strategic redundancy

• Supply chain resilience

This approach strengthens Europe within alliance structures without presuming full independence.

Liberal institutionalism clarifies how asymmetry can be politically sustainable through institutional management.⁷ Structural realism clarifies why hierarchy persists.

Autonomy becomes reinforcement, not rupture.

XI. Conclusion: Between Aspiration and Hierarchy

European strategic autonomy is often portrayed as inevitable evolution.

But inevitability is political narrative, not structural fact.

Capability asymmetries in nuclear deterrence, ISR dominance, and logistics define crisis credibility and operational authority. Ignoring these asymmetries risks transforming ambition into strategic illusion.

Europe can recalibrate dependence.

It cannot erase hierarchy without redistributing power at a scale it has neither financed nor politically unified to achieve.

Autonomy without capability is aspiration.
Autonomy within constraint is strategy.

Notes

1. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

3. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

4. Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006).

5. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

6. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

7. Keohane, After Hegemony.

Bibliography

Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

Posen, Barry R. “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006).

Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.